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This paper investigates the effects of ﬁscal policy on economic activity, public ﬁnances, welfare, and
income distribution in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a unionized labor market. The paper
shows that debt-ﬁnanced increases of public employment, wages of public sector employees, unem-
ployment beneﬁts and labor taxes put pressure on unions’ wage claims, leading to higher private sector
wages, lower employment, capital and output. In addition, increases of public employment, public
wages and unemployment beneﬁts increase workers’ utility relative to the pre-policy change equilib-
rium during the transition, but not in the long-run. Instead, workers’ utility decreases at any time
horizon when labor taxes increase. Capitalists always beneﬁt from increases in taxes on labor but their
welfare decreases when public spending goes up. Finally, the paper investigates the extent to which the
way the government balances its budget affects these results.1 Introduction
Cross-country differences in the size and composition of the government budget have stimulated a
lively debate on the effect of ﬁscal policy. Quite a large body of evidence has accumulated on the in-
ﬂuence of ﬁscal policy instruments on the macroeconomy while less is known about the distributional
effects of changes in the government budget’s composition.1 Theoretically, macroeconomists have lim-
ited their analysis to the impact of a limited set of ﬁscal policy variables in economies with perfectly
competitive labor markets. However, in several OECD countries (mainly continental Europe) unions
are very powerful and their presence can inﬂuence the effects and the transmission mechanism ofﬁscal
shocks. With the exception of Ardagna (2001), Cavallo (2003), Finn (1998), and Pappa (2004), macro-
economists have focused on the effect of government purchases of consumption and capital goods and
of different types of tax rates.2 They have mostly overlooked the effects of changes in welfare spend-
ing and public employment even if these items account for almost three quarters of total government
spending in OECD countries and since 1960 have become a larger share of total government spend-
1See, for example, Alesina et al. (2002), Alesina and Perotti (1997a), (1997b), Ardagna (2004), Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano (2000), and McDermot and Wescott (1996). See also Jantti (1997) and OECD (1991) for empirical evidence on the
effect of transfers and taxation on income distribution.
2See Burnside et al. (2003), Baxter and King (1993), Devereux et al. (1996), Dotsey (1994), Ludvigson (1996), Mendoza
and Tesar (1998), Ohanian (1997), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), among others, for
general equilibrium models that study the effect of changes of government purchases of goods and of different types of
taxes. Ardagna (2001), Cavallo (2003), Finn (1998), and Pappa (2004) introduce in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with perfect competitive input markets the distinction between government consumption and government employment. For
partial equilibrium models on the effect of public employment in unionized labor markets, see, instead, Algan, Cahuc, and
Zylberberg (2002) and Forni and Giordano (2003). See also Horner, Ngai and Olivetti (2004) who focus on the relation
between public ownership and unemployment.
1ing.3 Finally, theory has largely ignored distributional issues. In fact, the general equilibrium effects of
changes in ﬁscal policy have mostly been addressed in models with a representative agent.
These considerations suggest possible extensions tothe existing literature and motivate the present
paper. Speciﬁcally, the goal of this paper is to extend the work of Ardagna (2001), Cavallo (2003),
Finn (1998), and Pappa (2004) to an economy with unionized labor markets and heterogeneous agents
and examine the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of changes in a wide set of ﬁscal
instruments. To do so, the paper introducesﬁscal policy into the monopoly union model of Maffezzoli
(2001). In particular, the paper focuses on a two sector economy in which privateﬁrms produce a ho-
mogeneous consumption good using both capital and labor and the government hires public employees
to provide public services. The labor market is unionized and heterogenous agents (capitalists, private
and public sector employees, and unemployed workers) populate the economy.
The non competitive labor market framework allows to investigate the effect of changes toﬁscal
policy variables on unions’ wage claims and, via the latter, on employment, capital accumulation and
output. Alesina and Perotti (1997b), Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
provide empirical evidence in favor of the importance of this channel. Maffezzoli (2001) suggests that
a monopoly union model better reproduces the Italian business cycle (but not the US one) relatively
to the Hansen (1985) and Rogerson and Wright (1988) indivisible labor model. Zanetti (2004) shows
that European business cycle statistics are better matched in a unionized labor market model than in a
model with a competitive labor market. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no contribution
in the literature that systematically studies the effects of shocks to labor and capital taxes, government
3On average across OECD countries, government spending for welfare payments and public employment is equal to
72.1% of total government spending in 2002 and 65.76% in 1960.
2purchases of goods, public employment, wages of public employees, and unemployment beneﬁts in a
dynamic general equilibrium model with unionized labor markets. This is exactly what this paper does.
Moreover, the presence of heterogeneous agents in the model allows to investigate the distributional
and welfare effects due to changes in various types of public spending and taxes.
The paper reaches the following results. First, the benchmark model predicts that a debt-ﬁnanced
increase in government purchases of goods crowds out private consumption and has no effects on
the supply-side of the economy as in a standard neoclassical model with inelastic individual labor
supply. By contrast, increases in public employment, wages of public sector employees, unemployment
beneﬁts, and labor taxes affect output. In response to an increase in each of these variables, unions ask
for higher wages. The increase in labor costs decreases employment in the private sector and the rate
of return on capital, leading to a decrease in output. Increases in tax rates on capital income also
affect negatively capital accumulation and output, but they have no effect on unions wage claims and
employment in the private sector.
Second, ﬁscal policy shocks affect not only income of the various types of agents but also the
distribution of workers between the private andpublic sector and between employment and unemploy-
ment. Hence, changes to ﬁscal policy have a different effect on welfare of the representative capitalist
and of each type of worker (private employee, publicemployee and unemployed workers). Simulations
suggest that debt-ﬁnanced increases in public employment, public wages and unemployment beneﬁts
increase workers’ utility relative to the pre-policy change equilibrium during the transition, but not in
the long-run. Instead, workers’ utility decreases at any time horizon when labor taxes increase. Capi-
talists always beneﬁt from increases in taxes on labor income but their welfare decreases when public
spending goes up. Income inequality decreases in the short-run when public employment, wages of
3public employees and unemployment beneﬁts increase, but the effect switches sign after some years.
The opposite occurs when tax rates on labor income increase. Finally, the paper shows the extent to
which these conclusions are sensitive to the assumptions on how the government balances its intertem-
poral budget constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model and the
parameters used for the calibration. Section 3 details the response of output, employment, capital, con-
sumption, welfare, income distribution, primary deﬁcit, and public debt to changes in the ﬁscal policy
items discussed above. Section 4 presents some sensitivity analysis and extensions to the benchmark
model. The last section concludes.
2 Benchmark model
2.1 The set-up
The model adopts closely the monopoly union setupused in Maffezzoli (2001), and introduces a gov-
ernment sector and ﬁscal policy into the picture. The basic features of the economy can be summa-
rized as follows. Inﬁnitely lived individuals, perfectly competitive ﬁrms, monopolistic unions, and a
government populate a closed economy. Households have perfect foresight and derive their lifetime
utility from consumption of privately produced goods. There are Nk capitalists and N  workers in the
economy. Capitalists own the ﬁrms and their source of income is from capital and public bonds. They
choose consumptionand investmentto maximize their utility over an inﬁnitehorizon. Workers, instead,
consume all their disposable income in each period. They can be employed in the private or public sec-
tor or can be unemployed. If employed, workers offer inelastically one unit of labor and receive the
wage rate prevailing in each sector. If unemployed, workers receive a subsidy from the government.
4Workers are organized in unions. Unions set the wage rate to maximize the present discounted value
of their members’ expected utility. In the benchmark model, unions operate only in the private sector.
Labor unions are allowed to determine wages of both private and public sector workers in one of the
extensions of the model. Firms are perfectly competitive and produce a homogeneous consumption
good combining capital and labor with a constant return to scale technology. Technological progress
is labor augmenting at the exogenous rate x.4 Finally, the government purchases ﬁnal goods from the
private sector, hires labor to produce public services, pays unemployment beneﬁts, makes lump-sum
transfers and, in the benchmark model, also sets the wage rate of public employees. The government
ﬁnances its spending requirements by taxing labor and capital and by issuing debt. Public services may
affect the productivity of capital and labor employed in the private sector.
2.1.1 The household
The representative capitalist maximizes the following intertemporal utility function
   
t 0
 t log ckt  (1)
subject to his budget constraint and the equation for the capital accumulation.
bt 1x    1  rb
t  bt    1    kt rtkt   ckt   it  lst (2)
kt 1x    1     kt   it (3)
4Xt 1   Xtx where X is the state of the technology and x its gross rate of growth. The assumption of labor augmenting
technological progress and the functional forms used to describe preferences and technologysupport balanced - growth path
equilibria. Hence, without loss of generality, I present only the speciﬁcation for the detrended model where all quantity
variables (except employment) and wages are divided by the state of technology.
5ck represents the purchases of consumption goods by the representative capitalist and i his investment
in capital goods. b are public bonds, k capital goods, rb and r are the real rate of return of public
bonds and capital respectively. x is the gross growth rate of technological progress,  is the subjective
discount factor, and   is the rate at which capital depreciates. ls are lump-sum transfers and  k is the
tax rate on capital income. Income from public bonds is not taxed, depreciation allowances are zero,
and there are no costs for installing new capital. Maximizing (1) subject to the constraints (2) and (3),
simplifying and rearranging terms gives equations (4) and (5).
c
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kt    x 1c
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kt 1 1    1    kt 1 rt 1      (4)
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t 1    1    kt 1 rt 1     (5)
Workers’ utility depends on consumption of private goods: U   log c t . I follow Gali, Lopez-
Salido, and Valles (2003) and assume that, in each period, a worker spends all his disposable income
on private consumption. Workers can be employed in the private or public sector, or they can be
unemployed. If employed in the private or public sector, they offer inelastically one unit of labor, and
receive the wage rate  p and  g, respectively. If they are unemployed, they receive a subsidyu from
the government. Labor income is taxed at a rate   N, unemployment beneﬁts are not taxed.5 In the
benchmark model, workers don’t receive lump-sum transfers; this assumption is relaxed in section 4.3.
The following equations describe the consumption level of the three types of workers.
cpt    pt 1     Nt  (6)
cgt    gt 1     Nt  (7)
5Although this assumption is too extreme for many countries,relaxing it does not change the qualitative nature of the re-
sults. In order to have an effect of labor taxes on the wage rate of the private sector, the crucial assumption is that governments
tax unemployed beneﬁts at a rate lower than that on labor income. This is the case in most countries.
6cut   ut (8)
Workers are randomly assigned to the private or public sector or to the unemployed pool. Workers in
the private or public sector do not have different skills,nor jobs have different characteristics that affect
preferences. The model assumes that workers receive a different salary in the two sectors. Workers
are ex-ante identical. They become ex-post heterogenous, once the level of employment in the private
and public sector is ﬁxed, because they receive a different income according to their status.6 The labor
force is organized in unions.
2.1.2 The private sector
The labor market structure in the private sector is taken from Maffezzoli (2001). In a nutshell, workers
can sell their labor to only one ﬁrm at a time and each ﬁrm can hire from a pool of inﬁnitely many
workers. Workers are organized into aﬁrm-speciﬁc trade union. Unions act as monopolists in the labor
market and unilaterally set wages at the ﬁrm level.7 They maximize the expected present discounted
value of their members’ utility taking ﬁrms’ labor demand and workers’ reservation utility as given.8
6For simplicity, the paper assumes that there is no mobility of workers between private and public sector ﬁrms. Algan,
Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002) and Forni and Giordano (2003) rely on the same assumption to justify the difference of private
and public sector’s wages.
7It is well known that the monopoly union model does not lead to an efﬁcient wage - employment outcome. The literature
hasoftenusedthismodelforitssimplicity. Inparticular, whenonewantstostudytheeffectsofﬁscalpolicyinnoncompetitive
labor markets, the monopoly union model simpliﬁes the analysis and gives results that qualitatively do not differ from those
that one can obtain in a model in which unions andﬁrms bargain over the wage and the employment level. See, for example,
Alesina and Perotti (1997b) for a discussion on monopolistic union models versus alternatives.
8In Maffezzoli (2001) unions are risk neutral and maximize the expected present discounted value of labor incomes.
Also, unions act as a substitute for a competitive insurance market and sell actuarially fair insurance to their members. In
this way, agents can insure against the risk of being unemployed, and, in equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption
7Unions are large at the ﬁrm level, but they are small compared to the size of the economy and hence, it
is not unreasonable to assume that unions also take the rental price of capital andﬁscal policy variables
as given.
Maffezzoli (2001) shows that unions can be aggregated into a representative union facing a rep-
resentative ﬁrm. Also, under the assumption that pre-commitment is ruled out, the union and the ﬁrm
cannot credibly commit to a sequence of future wage rates and of future demand for capital. Hence, the
union and the ﬁrm effectively solve a sequence of non-cooperative dynamic games and employment in
the private sector, the wage rate of private sector employees and the capital stock are determined period
by period. The optimal solution of the union andﬁrm problem is a Nash equilibrium for the game.
This set-up gives a somewhat simpliﬁed picture of the wage setting procedures in OECD countries.
In particular, the model delivers the result that unions do not internalize the effect of the wage rate on
aggregate variables. This is due to the fact thatﬁrms and unions cannot precommit, that unions operate
at the ﬁrm level and are small at the economy level, and that they take the rental price of capital,
members’ reservation utility, and ﬁscal policy variables as given. Calmfors and Drifﬁl (1988) suggest
that such description may not be accurate for countries like the Scandinavian countries where unions
are large at the economy-wide level, but it may represent quite well the situation of countries with
intermediate degrees of unionization like Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, the assumptions in
Maffezzoli (2001) make the model analytically tractable and avoid time-consistency problems that
would arise if, for example, pre-commitment is not ruled out.
Firms produce a homogeneous consumption good withcapital and labor, taking prices as given. In
for employed and unemployed households are equalized. This allows to aggregate employed and unemployed households
members into a representative household. In the present paper, unions do not need to perform this addtional task because
agents are heterogeneous and heterogeneity is needed to study the effect ofﬁscal policy shocks on income distribution.
8order to take into account that services produced by public employees can inﬂuence the productivity of
labor and capital, I follow Barro (1990) and modify a standard Cobb-Douglas production function as
follows:
Yt   Ka
t N1 a
pt SG  (9)
where Y represents aggregate output, K the aggregate capital stock,9 Np the number of workers em-
ployed in the private sector, SG public services,a the capital share, and  measures the productivity of
public services in the production of private goods.
In the set-up just described, the representative ﬁrm demands labor and capital according to the
marginal productivity rule.
 1   a 
Yt
Npt




  rt (11)
The union chooses  p to maximize:








 pt 1     Nt 
 
 






subject to equations (9) and (10) and taking the rental price of capital, ﬁscal policy variables and
members’ reservation utility as given.
U A is the expected utility unions members receive when they are not employed in the private sector
(i.e.: members’ reservation utility), N  is the total number of workers (by assumption equal to unions’
9The aggregate capital stock is the sum of the capital stock that each capitalist of this economy accumulates. Hence,
K   Nkk 
9membership), and
Npt
N  measures the probability of being employed in the private sector.10
Substituting (9) in (10) and the resulting equation in (12), we can derive theﬁrst order condition
for the union:
log  pt 1     Nt     U A
t   a (13)
Thus, the equilibrium gross wage rate in the private sector,  p, depends on workers’ expected utility
when they are not employed in the private sector,U A, and on the tax rate on labor income,   N.
U A is the weighted average of workers’ utility if employed in the public sector and if unemployed
(conditional on not being employed in the private sector), with weights equal to the probability of being
employed in the public sector and of being unemployed:
U A
t   pt log  gt 1     Nt      1   pt log ut  (14)




log  pt 1     Nt    
Ngt
N    Npt
log  gt 1     Nt    
 N    Npt   Ngt 
N    Npt
log ut    a (15)
Ceteris paribus, an increase in public employment, Ng, increases the probability of workers being
employed in the public sector and decreases the one of being unemployed. If unemployment com-
pensations, u, are lower than the after-tax wage in the public sector,  g 1     N , unions’ members
reservation utility increases, leading to higher wages in the private sector. Similarly, an increase in g
(or in u) has a ceteris paribus positive effect on  p, because it raises workers’ expected utility of not
being employed in the private sector. A ceteris paribus increase in the tax rate on labor income,   N,
10As discussed above, Maffezzoli (2001) allows the union to offer its members actuarially fair insurance against the risk of
becoming unemployed. This assumption also tackles the possibility that ex-post unemployed workers leave the union.
10has, instead, two opposite effects on  p. On the one hand, the increase in   N reduces the net wage
of the worker, leading to an increase in the pre-tax real wage faced by the employer. On the other, it
reduces the after-tax wage of a public sector worker, decreasing workers’ reservation utility and mod-
erating unions’ wage demand. Differentiating (13) with respect to  N, however, one can show that the
ﬁrst effect dominates. Hence, wages for private sector workers increase in response to aceteris paribus
increase in   N too.
2.1.3 The government
The government hires public employees Ng and produces services SG according to the production
function SGt   N
 
gt. For simplicity, in the benchmark model, public services do not affect the produc-
tivity of labor and capital used by private sector ﬁrms (i.e.:     0 in (9)). Thus, public employment
related expenses are a pure waste as in Finn (1998). In section 4.1, I relax this assumption and public
employees produce services that have a positive effect on private production (i.e.:      0 in (9)).
Wages for the public sector employees,  g, are exogenous in the benchmark model. The paper
assumes that the government unilaterally ﬁxes them. In most countries, wages in the public sector
are the outcome of negotiations between governments’ ofﬁcials and public employees’ unions. The
assumption that  g is exogenous is a shortcut to simplify the theoretical framework. As shown in
section 4.2, the qualitative nature of the results of the benchmark model holds when we allow unions
to set wages in the public sector.11
11The literature has followed different approaches in modelingthe wage setting practices in the private and public sector.
Calmfors and Horn (1986) introduce public employment in a monopolistic union model, but they assume that the union
chooses the same wage rate for workers in the public and private sector and that labor is the only factor of production.
Holmund (1997) allows for different wages, but he models the wage bargaining between unions,ﬁrms and the government in
11The government also purchases goods from the private sector, pays lump-sum transfers and un-
employment subsidies. It ﬁnances its expenditures by taxing labor and capital at the rates   N and  k
respectively and by issuing debt. Equation (16)describes the government budget constraint:
Bt 1x   Bt 1 rb
t   Ngt gt pt  N  Npt Ngt ut pt gtYt   Nt  ptNpt  gt ptNgt   ktrtKt LSt
(16)
where B is the aggregate stock of public debt the government issues (B   bNk) and LS is the
total amount of lump-sum transfers. In the benchmark model, the government pays lump-sum transfers
only to capitalists, hence LS   lsNk.12 It is useful to assume that the government ﬁxes the pur-
chases of goods as a share of output, (Gt   gtYt), public employment as a share of total population,13
(Ngt   Ngt), and the wage rate of the public sector employees and unemployment beneﬁts as a share
of the wage in the private sector, ( gt    gt pt and ut   ut pt, respectively). The government also
faces a no-Ponzi game condition, lim
T  
  T
t 0 1   rb
t   BT   0, which implies that the present value of
government expenditures equals the present value of tax revenues plus the initial stock of public debt.
The government sets lump-sum transfers LSto balance its budget constraint intertemporally.14
a model without capital accumulation. Onthe one hand, extending the model following Holmund (1997) would complicate
the analysis beyond the scope of this work. On the other, following Calmfors and Horn (1986) one cannot study the effect
that changes in government wages have on the economy, shutting down a channel that is empirically important as shown,
for example, by Alesina et al. (2002). Finally, note also that the empirical work by Alesina et al. (2002) suggests that the
direction of causality goes from public sector wages and employment to wages and employment in the private sector. This
gives some support to the assumption that government wages and employment are exogenous. However, the strength and
robustness of this evidence is ultimately an importantempirical question that this paper does not address.
12Section 4.3 investigates the implication of this assumption.
13Total population is equal to Nk   N    1.
14Note that public debt is “Ricardian” in the sense that, given its initial value and the values of the exogenous ﬁscal
policy instruments, public debt’s time path does not affect equilibrium allocations. Hence, in the benchmark model, setting
12Finally, in each period, the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock
Kt 1x   Kt 1       It (17)
and the economy’s resource constraint hold.
Yt   Nkckt   Nptcpt   Ngtcgt    N    Npt   Ngt cut   It   gtYt (18)
where I represents aggregate investment and K is the aggregate stock of capital.
2.2 Solving the model
The sequence of endogenous quantity and price variables  bt 1 kt 1  ckt  cpt  cgt  cut  Npt, Yt, it, rt,
 pt, rb
t   that solves the ﬁrst order conditions for households, unions andﬁrm’s problems (equations (4)
- (8), (10), (15), and (11)), equations (9), (16) - (18), the sequence of the exogenous variables   Nt,  kt,
Ngt,  gt, ut, gt, lst , and the initial values of the predetermined ones bt kt  deﬁne the equilibrium of
the model economy. Numerical solutions of changes to the exogenous ﬁscal policy variables involve
the computation of the long-run, balanced-growth path equilibria before and after the change occurs
and of the transitional dynamics between the two steady-state equilibria. Equations (4) - (10) and (15) -
(18) deﬁne a system of stationary non-linear difference equations that describe the dynamic behavior of
the economy. To determine the solution for the endogenous variables, I loglinearize the system around
the steady-state values of the variables andapply the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980).15
lump-sum transfers so that the no-Ponzi game condition holds affects only public debt’s time path.
15The equations deﬁning the balanced-growth path equilibrium, the simpliﬁed set of equilibrium conditions, and the log-
linearized system of difference equations used to determine the solution for the endogenous variables are available upon
request.
132.3 Welfare analysis
To compute the welfare cost of a particular policy, the paper follows Ohanian (1997) and calculates the
additional level of consumption to give to each agent of the economy so that his utility obtained with
the policy change equals that in the pre-policy change case. More speciﬁcally, the paper ﬁnds the value
of  i that satisﬁes the following equation:
J  
t 0
 t  
log c 
it 1    i     Ui0
 
  0 (19)
where: Ui0 is deﬁned as the utility level in the pre-change scenarioUi0   log ci0 , c 
it is consumption
of agent i at the time and after the policy change, i refers to the representative capitalist, employee of
the private sector, employee of the public sector and unemployed worker, and J   200.
The paper also computes welfare costs for a “hypothetical” worker (i.e.: a worker who does not
know if she will be employed in the private or public sector or if she will be unemployed) and a
“hypothetical” household (i.e.: an agent who can be a capitalist with probability Nk or a worker with
probability N ).16
2.4 Calibration
Table 1 shows the parameter values used to calibratethe model at a yearly frequency. The calibration of
the values for the technology and preferences’ parameters follows the literature and sets    1 3,    
0 1, and     0 98. In the benchmark model,     0 and the remaining parameters are the unweighted
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.
14average data of ten European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) in the period 1965 - 1995. Section 4.4 calibrates the model
using US data in the same period. Tax rates on labor and capital income are from Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) and Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999) who provide an update of the series by Mendoza et al. (1994).
The other data are from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 62.
The benchmark model sets the tax rate on labor income,   N  at 36.67% and the one on capital
income,  k, at 32.09%. The value of public employment as a share of the labor force, Ng  and the
wage premium between wages in the private and public sector, g  are equal to 16.76% and 112.42%,
respectively. The replacement rate, u  is the ratio of per-capita transfers to the compensation workers
in the private sector receive and it is equal to 25.17%. Government spending forﬁnal goods as a share
of GDP, g, is equal to 5.70%. In the initial steady-state, I set lump-sum transfers so that the initial value
of the debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to 50.36%, the average value of the ten European countries between
1965 and 1995. I keep lump-sum transfers constant at this value for 100 periods. Then, I adjust them
to ensure that the no-Ponzi game condition holds.17 The average real per-capita growth rate of output
is equal to 2.41%. Total population is normalized to 1 and N  and Nk are equal to 83.27% and 16.73%
respectively, where 16.73% is the average value of theratio of self-employed workers to the labor force
17Lump - sum transfers from t   1     J are set to satisfy the following equation:
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where variables at t   0 assume the value in the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium, T1   100, and
J   200 
15inthe ten Europeancountries between 1965 and 1995.18 Section 4.4 checks the robustness of the results
to the parameters used to calibrate the model.
Table 2 shows the actual values of the employment and the unemployment rate and of the ratios of
capital, investment, and consumption to GDP, together with the model’s steady-state values of the same
variables. When I use the average data over the entire period to calibrate the model, the steady-state
value of the capital-to-output ratio is equal to 156.1%, the ones of investment and total consumption as
a share of GDP are 19.4% and 74.9%, respectively. The sum of the employment rate in the private and
public sector is 70.4% and the unemployment rate is 12.9%. In the data, the average capital-to-output
ratio across European countries over the period 1965 - 1995 is 202.6%, private investment as a share
of GDP is 18.7%, public investment as a share of GDP is 3%, private consumption, net export, and
government consumption are 58.19%, 0.14%, and 19%, respectively.19 The ratio of employment in the
private and public sector to the labor force is 77.33% and the unemployment rate is 5.92%. Thus, the
model implies a lower capital-to-output ratio and employment rate and a higher unemployment rate,
but it ﬁts well the data of private investment and private consumption. In fact, in the model, the ratio of
consumption-to-GDP is the residual component of the national income identity since public investment
and net export are zero by assumption.
18I measure the number of capitalists in the economy using the fraction of the population in the ten European countries
that does not receive any dependent labor income. The qualitative nature of the results does not change if I calibrate the
model setting, for example, Nk equal to 33%, where 33% is the average value of the proﬁts-to-GDP ratio in the ten European
countries between 1965 - 1995.
1919% includes the ratio of non-wage government spending as a share of GDP (g in the model) that is equal to 5.7% in the
data.
163 Policy experiments
The paper analyzes the effects of a permanent, unanticipated, debt-ﬁnanced 1% increase of each of
the exogenous ﬁscal policy variables, keeping the others ﬁxed at their initial level. The paper simu-
lates the model for 200 periods and gives data as percentage deviations from the pre-policy change
balanced-growth equilibrium for all variables except the ratios of public debt, primary deﬁcit, primary
expenditure and revenues to GDP. I express the latter as percentage points deviations. Impact effects
correspond to changes at the time of the increase in the ﬁscal policy item. Long-run effects measure
deviations between the pre and post-policy change balanced-growth equilibria.
3.1 Effects on the macroeconomy
This section looks at the effects of ﬁscal policy changes on employment, capital accumulation and
output. It discusses the principal channels through whichﬁscal policy instruments inﬂuence the macro-
economy in the monopoly union model, highlights the similarities and differences in the transmission
mechanism relatively to a model with perfect competitive labor markets and summarizes the results of
the numerical simulations.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (and the ﬁrst four charts of Figure 1) show the impact and long-run
effects of a 1% increase of government consumption,g. An increase in g reduces resources available to
the private sector. This generates a negative wealth effect that crowds out capitalists’ consumption. As
in a standard neoclassical model with inelastic labor supply, the increase in g does not have any effect
on the supply-side of the economy, neither on impact nor in the long-run, because, by assumption,
government consumption of goods does not inﬂuence workers’ utility. In addition, unions are small
and operate at the ﬁrm level taking the rate of return on capital as given. Hence, employment in the
17private sector does not depend on g, and output and the capital stock remain unchanged.
Ina model with elasticindividuallabor supply, employment intheprivate sector, output and invest-
ment change following a shock to g. However, the direction of the changes depends on the elasticity of
the individual labor supply, on how government spending isﬁnanced (lump-sum versus distortionary
taxation), on the time path of taxes and on the persistence of the spending shock.20 The negative ef-
fect of the increase of government consumption on aggregate consumption, instead, holds in a model
with elastic labor supply when this model is calibrated using plausible parameters’ values. In fact, as
Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2006) show the existence of
both sticky prices and of Ricardian and non-Ricardian households are necessary conditions to obtain a
positive correlation betweenpublic and private consumption.
Fiscal policy has non zero effects on the economy through the labor market and the supply-side
when it involves changes in public employment, public wages and unemployment beneﬁts. Let’s con-
sider ﬁrst public employment (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 and the ﬁrst four charts of Figure 1).
An increase in public employment affects the fall-back position of the private sector union. Union
members’ reservation utility increases as the probability of ﬁnding a job in the public sector goes up.
20For example, Ardagna (2001) shows that in response to a debt-ﬁnanced increase in g (as the experiment considered in
this section), the negative wealth effect generated by the ﬁscal shock leads to a derease in households’ consumption and to
an increase in the supply of hours of work, assuming that both consumption and leisure are normal goods. Employment in
the private sector, output and investment increase on impact. Given that the level of the capital stock isﬁxed at the time of
the policy change, the capital-labor ratio decreases, leading to a lower wage rate and higher rate of return on capital. Over
time, the capital stock increases, driving the capital-labor ratio up. In the new long - run balanced growth equilibrium, the
capital-labor ratio, hence   and r  is back to its initial value. Output, employment, and the capital stock are higher than in
the pre-policy change equilibrium. See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, J. (2003)for a model in which public spending is,
instead, ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation and Alesina et al. (2002) for a review of the literature.
18As a result, private sector unions push up their wage claims and private sector employment falls by
0.55% on impact. Due to the fact that ﬁrms and unions cannot precommit, that unions operate at the
ﬁrm level and are small at the economy level, and that they take the rental price of capital andﬁscal
policy variables as given, employmentin the private sector depends only on ﬁscal policy and technol-
ogy parameters. Hence, Np converges to the new steady-state value immediately as public employment
increases.21 The level of the capital stock isﬁxed at the time of the policy change. As employment falls,
the capital-labor ratio increases and the rate of return on capital decreases. Output in theﬁrst period
of the transition is lower than its value in the initial steady by 0.37% and investment decreases too. As
investment decreases, the capital stock falls, further reducing output. But, as capital decreases, its rate
of return goes up. In the new steady-state, p andr are back to their initial values. Output, employment
in the private sector, and the capital stock are lower than in the pre-policy change equilibrium. Also,
the increase in public employment does not compensate for the decrease in private employment and
unemployment increases as well.
These results are in line with the empirical evidence. For example, Malley and Moutos (1998)
analyze the effect of public employment on private and aggregate employment in Sweden during the
period 1964-1990. They show that the sharp increase in public employment crowded out employment
in the private sector and contributed to the increase in unemployment. Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg
(2002) reach similar results using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2000.
Finally, note that in a model with perfect competitive labor markets as in Ardagna (2001), Cavallo
(2003), Finn (1998), and Pappa (2004), an increase in public employment has similar qualitative effects
21The equation for employment in the private sector can be obtained substituting equations Ngt   Ngt,  gt    gt pt
and ut   ut pt in equation (15). Solving for Npt, we obtain Npt   N   
Ngt[log  gt  log 1   Nt  log ut ]
log 1   Nt  log ut  a .
19on macroeconomic variables. However, the propagation mechanism of the shock is different from the
one just described. In a competitive labor market model, the increase in public employment and the
negative wealth effect associatedwith it leadtoa decline ofconsumptionand leisure assuming that both
goods are normal. Labor supply increases, but the increase in the supply of hours of work only partially
matches the increase in Ng. There is a shift of labor out of the private and into the public sector. This
generates the decrease in employment in the privatesector which triggers the fall in investment, output
and the capital stock.
Let’s now turn to the effects of a 1% increase in public employees’ wages and unemployment ben-
eﬁts (see columns 5-8 of Table 3 and theﬁrst four charts of Figure 1). Changes in these policy variables
have the same qualitative effect of changes of public employment and the shocks are transmitted via
the same channel. In fact, when  g and u increase, the expected income workers receive if they are
not employed in the private sector goes up. Hence, unionmembers’ reservation utility increases and so
does the union’s fall-back position. This leads to the same results illustrated for the case of a surge in
public employment.22
Columns 9 and 10 of Table 3 (and the ﬁrst four charts of Figure 1) show the impact and long-run
effects of a 1% increase in labor income taxes,   N. Once again, the ﬁscal shock affects employment,
output, investment and the capital stock through the same channel identiﬁed in the case of an increase
in public employment, wages of public sector workers and unemployment beneﬁts. Quantitatively,
however, note that the effects from a 1% increase in  N are smaller than the ones from a 1% increase in
22In perfect competitive labor market models, it is not possible to analyze the effect of changes in unemployment beneﬁts.
In a model with perfect competitive labor markets one can introduce transfers to leisure and interpret them as unemployment
beneﬁts compensations. Note that changes in such transfers would have the same qualitative effects (but with the opposite
sign) of changes of labor income taxes.
20Ng  g  and u. Also, it is important to note that, contrary toa standard neoclassical model with perfect
competitive labor markets, the response of macroeconomic variables to changes in labor taxes does not
depend on the elasticity of substitution of the individual labor supply. In a standard neoclassical model,
the income and substitution effects work in opposite directions: the ﬁrst leads to a decrease in leisure,
the second generates an increase in L when labor taxes increase. Hence, the response of the supply of
hours of work and the equilibrium of the economy depend on the relative strength of the two effects
and a 1% increase in   N generates consequences similar to those of the monopoly union model if the
substitution effect dominates. However, Dotsey (1994) and Ludvigson (1996) show that, for this to
happen, the individual labor supply has to assume very high, and probably, unrealistic values.23
Finally, an increase in the capital income tax rate reduces the net of tax return on saving, leading
to an increase in capitalists’ consumption at the time of the policy change. However, on impact,  k
does not affect employment in the private sector. Given that the level of the capital stock isﬁxed at the
time of the policy change, output, the capital-labor ratio, hence, r and  p, do not change. Workers’
consumption does not vary as well, because their disposable income remains at the initial value. Driven
bytheincreaseincapitalists’consumption, totalprivateconsumptionincreasesby0.17%onimpactand
aggregate investment decreases by 0.67%. Over time, the decrease in saving and investment reduces
the capital stock and output and it decreases the capital-labor ratio. In the new balanced-growth path
equilibrium, r is higher and  p is lower than in the pre-policy change case. As in the case of g, in this
model, both the qualitative results and the propagation mechanism are similar to those of a standard
neoclassical model.
23See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) for general equilibrium models that generate
predictions consistent with the empirical evidence in the US. These models assume competitive labor markets but departure
from the standard neoclassical approach in other dimensions.
213.2 Effects on public ﬁnances
The second part of Table 3 (and theﬁfth and sixth charts of Figure 1) show that the largest deterioration
in public ﬁnances occurs when wages of the public sector employees or the number of public sector
workers increase, while an identical percentage rise (1%) in unemployment beneﬁts or public con-
sumption has a smaller effect. Increases in labor and capital tax rates reduce primary deﬁcit and public
debt and changes in labor tax rates have larger effects than changes in capital tax rates. It is interesting
to note that the change in primary deﬁcit and public debt following a 1% change in the capital tax
rate is lower, in absolute value, than the change inany spending item except government consumption.
Hence, the model suggests that the most effective measures to improve the stance of publicﬁnance are
decreases in public employment, wages of publicsector employees, and unemployment beneﬁts and/or
increases in labor tax rates. Changes to government consumption and tax rates on capital income seem
to play only a minor role. Note that these predictionsof the model are somewhat consistent with empir-
ical literature on ﬁscal consolidations, which suggests thatﬁscal consolidations focusing on cuts to the
government wage bill and welfare payments are more likely to permanently reduce the stock of public
debt (see, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998)) and Ardagna (2004)).
3.3 Effects on welfare and income distribution
What is the effect of various changes in ﬁscal policy on income distribution? Let’s begin with the
welfare effects due to a 1% increase in public employment (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). As
discussed in section 3.1, the wage rate of private sector employees,  p, increases. Because income of
public sector and unemployed workers is linked to  p, income, consumption, and utility of all types
of workers increase in the short-run. However, in the new steady-state equilibrium, workers’ utility
22converges to its value before the increase in Ng because the wage rate goes back to its pre-policy
change level. Note that, even though life-time utility of a public and a private sector employee and
of an unemployed worker increases, welfare of a “hypothetical” worker, (i.e.: a worker who does not
know if she will be employed in the private or publicsector or if she will be unemployed), decreases. In
fact, although the probability of being employed in the public sector increases with Ng, the probability
of being employed in the private sector decreases and the one of being unemployed increases because
the increase in Ng generates a decrease in Np and an increase in unemployment. This outweighs
the positive effect of the higher wage rate on workers’ welfare and the expected lifetime utility of a
“hypothetical” worker goes down. Income inequality, measured by the change in the Gini coefﬁcient,
decreases in the short-run. However, it is higher in the post-policy change equilibrium than in the
pre-policy change one.24
Effects on welfare and income distribution due to a 1% increase in public employees’ wages and
in unemployment beneﬁts are similar to the ones following a 1% increase in public employment. The
only exception is the increase in income inequality occurring at the time of the increase in g. Welfare
costs due to a 1% increase in labor taxes differ among agents. Among workers, the unemployed are
the only ones who gain from the increase in labor taxes. Their disposable income goes up on impact,
because unemployment subsidies are tied to the wage rate in the private sector and because they are
24Table 1 shows that public employment has sharply increased since the mid-sixties. One of the arguments in the literature
to explain this trend suggests that governments use public employment to redistribute resources across groups or geographical
regions and that the size of redistribution through this channel is large. For example, Alesina et al. (1999) argue that about
one half of the wage bill of Southern Italy can be seen as a pure transfer from the North. In the model, public employment
redistributesresourcesfromcapitaliststoworkers. However, asdiscussed, themodelsuggeststhatthispolicybeneﬁts workers
and decreases income inequality only temporarily.
23tax-exempt. Welfare of private sector and public sector workers, instead, decreases both on impact
and in the steady-state, since the increase in the wage rate is smaller than the one in taxation and,
thus, consumption decreases. Workers’ aggregate consumption goes down as well. By contrast, more
resources are available to capitalists whose consumption and utility increase. The Gini coefﬁcient goes
uponimpact, but, inthelong-run, itdecreasesby1.5%. Finally, a1%increaseincapitaltaxesgenerates
an increase in capitalists’ consumption and utility because, as explained in section 3.1, capitalists’
saving decreases due to the fall in the net of tax return on saving. Workers’ consumption and utility,
instead, decrease along the transition path and the new steady state due to the permanent reduction in
 p. Income inequality decreases in response to an increase in the tax rate on capital income.
In summary, increases in government employment, unemployment beneﬁts and wages of public
sector employees hurt capitalists but increase life-time welfare of each type of worker. The opposite
occurs when tax rates increase. However, if we consider thatﬁscal policy also changes the probability
of being employed and that workers are ex-ante identical (hence, in each period they can be either
employed or unemployed), their expected life-time utility decreases even whenNg,  g, and u increase.
Thus, these measures generate a welfare cost for a “hypothetical” worker too.
4 Sensitivity and extensions
This section discusses some sensitivity analysis and extensions to the benchmark model. First, I allow
public employment to inﬂuence the productivity of private production. Second, I introduce unions in
the public sector and endogeneize the choice of public employment and government wages. Third, I
relax the assumption that only capitalists receive lump-sum transfers. Finally, I calibrate the model
setting ﬁscal policy variables at their smallest values across the European countries in the sample, at
24their average values in the sub-periods 1965 - 1970 and 1991 - 1995, or I use average US data over
the period 1965 - 1995. I also compare the effects ofﬁscal policy in Europe and the US. Fiscal policy
experiments are the same as in section 3, unless otherwise noted.
4.1 Productivity of public services
In order to take into account that services produced by public employees can inﬂuence the productivity
of labor and capital used by ﬁrms in the private sector, I relax the assumption that   in (9) is equal to




       measures the productivity of public workers in the production of privately produced goods.
I calibrate the model setting the parameter   equal to 1/3, 2/3, and 1. Figure 2 shows the impulse
response functions to a 1% increase in public employment for different values of . For comparison,
Figure 2 also plots the impulse response functions for the benchmark model (    0).
Changing the parameter  has effect on the percentage deviation from the initial steady state of em-
ployment in the private sector, capital, output, total private consumption, public debt, primary deﬁcit,
utility of the different agents, and the Gini coefﬁcient.25 As expected, the negative effect on the macro-
economy is smaller if public employment contributes to the productivity of private employment and
capital. Ceteris paribus, we obtain the same qualitative results than in the benchmark model (i.e.: a
negative effect on economic activity following an increase in Ng) if   is smaller or equal to 0.58. For
  greater than 0.58, instead, a 1% increase in Ng leads to an increase in private sector employment,
capital, output, and total private consumption. Results about the effects of changes of ﬁscal policy
variables except public employment do not dependon the assumption about the productivity of public
25Charts detailing the response of utility of different agents and the Gini coefﬁcient are not shown, but they are available
upon request.
25workers. To my knowledge, there are no papers that calibrate the productivity of public workers. Finn
(1998) considers a model in which public capital affects the production of private goods, andﬁxes the
parameter that measures the productivity of publiccapital in the production function to about one half
of the parameter that measures the productivity of private capital. Using the same criteria and setting 
equal to 1 3, results of the benchmark model still hold.
4.2 Endogenous choice of public employment and government wages
To endogeneize the choice of public employment and government wages I model the public sector
along the lines of the private sector and allow monopoly unions to unilaterally set wages of public
sector workers at the ﬁrm level. As unions in the private sector, public sector unions are large at the
ﬁrm level, but they are small compared to the size of the economy and they cannot credibly commit
to a sequence of future wage rates. Hence, in each period, public sector unions maximize utility of
their members taking public sector ﬁrms’ labor demand, workers’ reservation utility, the rental price
of capital and ﬁscal policy variables as given. Moreover, I assume that hiring decisions in the private
and public sector happen simultaneously and that each sector takes employment and the wage rate of
the other sector as given. Hence, private and public sector unions set wages non-cooperatively. Algan,
Cahucm and Zylberberg (2002) follow this approach, while Forni and Giordano (2003) also consider
the case in which private and public sector unions set wages cooperatively.
Public sector ﬁrms produce public services and they set the level of public employment Ng. Dif-
ferent approaches have been followed in the literature to model public ﬁrms’ objective function. In
the benchmark model, Algan, Cahucm and Zylberberg (2002) consider the case of a benevolent gov-
ernment that maximizes the difference between the public good’s social value and its cost, and, hence,
26the government hires public workers up to the point where the marginal utility of the public good
produced by public employees is equal to its social costs. Overemployment in the public sector may,
instead, occur if politicians pursue personal objectives and, for example, see public enterprises also
as a vehicle for policy-makers to gain voters’ support and enlarge their constituencies. I take this
latter view and, contrary to private sector ﬁrms, I assume that public sector ﬁrms are not only inter-
ested in maximizing proﬁts, but also care about the level of the wage bill of public employees. They
see higher public sector wages or public employment as a way to enhance popularity among vot-
ers. Hence, public sector ﬁrms choose the level of employment to maximize the following objective
function:       SGt   gtNgt     gtNgt . SGt is the output of the public enterprise that is produced
only with labor according to the production function SGt   N
 
gt. SGt    gtNgt measures the operat-
ing proﬁts of public sector ﬁrms.   0 measures the extent by which governments care about their
workers’ wage bill. Hence, a higher value of   signals that public sector ﬁrms value Ng and/or  g
more than proﬁt maximizers’ ﬁrms.26
In this set-up, public sector ﬁrms’ optimal demand of labor is:
 gt  
 




The public sector union chooses  g to maximize
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subject to public sectorﬁrm’s labor demand and taking the rental price of capital,ﬁscal policy variables
and members’ reservation utility as given. Note that
Ngt
N  measures the probability of being employed in
the public sector and   U A is the expected utility unions members receive when they are not employed
26Forni and Giordano (2003) also assume that the public employer’s objective function combines a proﬁt motivation with
a political motivation. However, they model the latter assuming that the government cares about total employment. The
assumption that the government is concerned about the wage bill of public employees simpliﬁes the algebra.
27in the public sector (  U A
t     pt log  pt 1     Nt      1     pt log ut  where   pt  
Npt
N  Ngt). The ﬁrst
order condition for the public sector union problem is similar to (12) and in equilibrium the wage of
government sector workers is:
log  gt 1     Nt    
Npt
N    Ngt
log  pt 1     Nt    
 N    Npt   Ngt 
N    Npt
log ut     1      (21)
Relatively to the benchmark case in section 3, the equilibrium of the economy also includes equa-
tions (20) and (21) among the ﬁrst order conditions, Ngt and  gt among the endogenous variables,
and   and   among the parameters to calibrate. To simulate the effect of a permanent, unanticipated,
debt-ﬁnanced 1% increase of each of the exogenousﬁscal policy variables    Nt,  kt, ut, gt  and of the
parameter  , I follow the same steps described in section 2.2.
Table 4 summarizes the results for the case in which     1 3 and     0 10 in the initial steady-
state. The table shows that qualitative nature of the results delivered by the benchmark model holds.
Note that a 1% increase in the value of the parameter that measures the extent by which governments
care about their workers’ wage bill has effects similar to those generated by changes in Ngt and  gt
in the benchmark economy even though endogenous variables’ response to the shock is mitigated.
In response to a 1% increase in  , public employment increases by 0.18% and, at the same time,
wages in the government sector decrease by 0.008%. This reduces the extent by which wages in the
private sector increase and employment in the private sector decreases. However, the magnitude of the
changes in response to an increase in   are increasing in the value of the parameter and the response
of the economy is quite large if, for example,     0 25. While this set of results is clearly only a ﬁrst
step to understand much more complex relations among wage negotiations in the private and public
sector, their interactions and the effects on the macroeconomy, evidence offered in Table 4 and Figure
3 is encouraging. In fact, results of the benchmark economy hold when the public sector labor market
28is modeled along the same lines of the private sector.
4.3 The effect of governments’ decisions on how to balance the budget constraint
The benchmark model analyzes the effect of debt-ﬁnanced changes in ﬁscal policy variables and as-
sumes that the government balances its budget intertemporally by changing the amount of lump-sum
transfers paid to capitalists. What if lump-sum transfers are distributed also to workers? Because
workers consume all their income in each period, changes in lump-sum transfers affect workers’ con-
sumption and, hence, contrary to the benchmark model, public debt’s time-path affects equilibrium
allocations. To investigate the implications of this modiﬁcation for the results discussed so far, this
section considers the case in which lump-sum transfers are paid in equal amount to all the households
of the economy. However, I simplify the analysis and assume that, in response to changes in g, Ngt,
 gt, ut,   Nt,  kt, lump-sum transfers are nowused to balance the government budget constraint in each
period, rather than intertemporally, and, hence, I set B   0. While this assumption is likely to affect
the timing and the magnitude of the response of macroeconomic variables to changes inﬁscal policy,
nevertheless it is useful to show the directions in which results of the model in section 3 change if
lump-sum transfers are also paid to workers.
In the modiﬁed model, consumption of the three types of workers depends also on lump-sum
transfers (cpt    pt 1   Nt  lst, cgt    gt 1   Nt  lst, cut   ut lst) and, hence, unions objective
function changes as well. As a result, equation (15) becomes equal to: log  pt 1     Nt    lst   
Ngt
N  Npt log  gt 1   Nt  lst  
 N  Npt Ngt 
N  Npt log ut  lst  
a pt 1   Nt 
 pt 1   Nt  lst , and the government budget
constraintisequalto: LSt   lst Nk N     Ngt gt pt  N  Npt Ngt ut pt gtYt   Nt  ptNpt 
 gt ptNgt     ktrtKt.
29Table 5 shows the extent by which results in Table 1 change following the change in the model’s
structure. Interestingly and contrary to the benchmark model in section 3, changes to government
consumptionofgoods andservices andchanges intaxrates on capital income affect the macroeconomy
also through the labor market. In fact, changes in these budget items require changes in lump-sum
transfers which, in turn, affect private wages unions demand and private sector employment. Consider,
for example, columns (1) and (2). A 1% increase in g leads to a decrease in lump-sum transfers of
0.48% on impact and in the long-run. The decrease in lst affects income of the private sector worker
and their fall-back options. As a result, private sector unions push up their wage claims and private
sector employment falls by 0.03% on impact. The level of the capital stock isﬁxed at the time of the
policy change. As employment falls, the capital-labor ratio increases and the rate of return on capital
goes down. Output in the ﬁrst period of the transition is lower than its value in the initial steady by
0.03% and investment decreases too. As investment goes down, the capital stock falls, further reducing
output. But, as capital decreases, its rate of return goes up. In the new steady-state, p and r are back
to their initial values. Output, employment in the private sector, and the capital stock are lower than in
the pre-policy change equilibrium and such policy change implies a welfare cost for all agents of this
economy. In summary, changes inlst induce similar qualitative responses that changes in Ngt,  gt, ut,
  Nt have in the benchmark model.
Columns (3)-(8) show the effect of a 1% increase in Ngt,  gt, ut. Given that changes in these
ﬁscal policy variables lead to a decrease in lump-sum transfers and that lump-sum transfers operate in
the economy through the same channels as changes in Ngt,  gt, ut, the effect on the macroeconomy is
ampliﬁed. In fact, private sector unions demand higher wages both because Ngt,  gt, ut increase and
30because lst decreases.27 Instead, when taxes on labor income increase, lump-sum transfers increase as
well and the two policy changes have opposite effects on unions’ objective function: the increase in
  Nt tends to push unions’ wage claims up, the increase inlst tends to push unions’ wage claims down.
Columns (9) and (10) show that the latter effect dominates. Hence, results are completely reversed
from those in the benchmark model.
Summarizing, results discussed in section 3 depend on the assumption that lump-sum transfers
are paid only to capitalists. Our previous conclusions concerning the effect of changes in public em-
ployment, wage of public employees and unemployment beneﬁts strengthened if the government pays
lump-sum transfers to workers too. Instead, in response to an increase in tax rates on labor income,
results are the opposite of those in the benchmark model. In the framework of this model, this is due to
the assumption that workers consume all their income in each period, and hence, changes in lump-sum
transfers affect workers’ consumption and equilibrium allocations.
4.4 Fiscal reforms in different time periods and countries
The qualitative nature of the results does notchange when I use the smallest values of the ﬁscal policy
variables across the European countries in the sample in calibrating the benchmark model. The magni-
tude of the changes obviously differs and it is increasing in the level of theﬁscal policy variables: a 1%
increase in policy instruments has a lower impact on the macroeconomy, public ﬁnances, welfare and
income inequality when I calibrate the model using the smallest values of the ﬁscal policy variables
27Note that the magnitude of the results in Table 5 is not directly compared with that of results in Table 1. In fact, not
only the ﬁnal steady state values of the endogenous variables are different but also the initial steady state values differ due to
the absence of lst in equations (6), (7), (8), and (15) of the benchmark model, and the difference in the government budget
constraint in the two models.
31than when I use the average values over all sub - periods.
I also checked whether the effects of each policy shock differ across time periods, calibrating the
model with data in the years 1965 - 1970 and 1991 - 1995. As Table 1 shows, the values of allﬁscal
policy variables, except the ratio of wages in the publicand private sector, increase over time, while the
real per capita growth rate and the ratio of self-employed workers to the labor force decline. Results
are similar to those in the benchmark model and they are stronger when I use the most recent data.
Hence, ceteris paribus, the effect of aﬁscal reform implemented between 1991 and 1995 is larger than
that which the same reform would have had should it had taken place between 1965 and 1970.
Finally, I calibrate the model using US average data over the period 1965 - 1995.28 Table 6 shows
the results. Both the impact and the steady state effect of a 1% increase in public employment, wages of
public sector employees, unemployment beneﬁts and labor taxes are smaller in the US than in Europe,
while the opposite occurs when tax rates on capital income increase. These results are due to the fact
that all ﬁscal variables, except tax rates on capital income and the ratio of government consumption to
GDP, are lower in the US than in Europe.
Differences in economic policies are often blamed for differences in the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of the European countries versus the US. The model can provide an answer to the following
question: what would have been the change in economic situation in Europe ifﬁscal policy variables
were, on average, set equal to those in the US? Figure 4 plots the response of the economy to this
change in ﬁscal policy.29 I calibrate the initial steady state equilibrium using average data of the Eu-
28Data are shown at the bottom of Table 6.
29While steady state effects are quite instructive, impact effects have to be taken with caution, because the dynamics of the
model is worked out loglinearizing the system around steady state values and changes in ﬁscal policy variables are sizeable
in this experiment.
32ropean countries in the sample and the ﬁnal one with the averages of the US data. At the time of the
policy change, employment in the private sector and output increase by 18% and 12%, respectively. In
the long - run, they are 18% and 9% higher than in the pre - policy change equilibrium. The capital
stock decreases by 7% in the steady state. All agents in the economy, except the unemployed workers,
beneﬁt from the policy shift and income inequality substantially decreases.30 Finally, public ﬁnances
improves leading to a decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
How do these results compare with actual data? Using series from the OECD Economic Outlook
from 1965 to 1995 for real output, real capital stock in the business sector, employment in the private
sector, population, and purchasing power parity (PPP), I calculate real output, real capital stock in the
business sector and employment in the private sector (in PPP value) as a share of population and I
average them both across the ten European countries in Table 1 and in the US. I, then, compute the
percentage change in per capita output, capital stock and employment in the private sector between the
average values in Europe and intheUS.Interestingly,results discussedabove match thedata pretty well
(see Table 7). In fact, on average, over the period 1965 - 1995, real per capita income, and employment
in the private sector as a share of population were 48% and 22% higher in the US than in Europe, while
the capital stock was 23% lower in the former country than in the latter. In the model, these numbers
are 9%, 18%, and -7%. Hence, ceteris paribus, the model can explain 19% of the difference between
30Note that the experiment implies a decrease in public employment, wages of public sector employees, unemployment
beneﬁts and labor taxes and an increase in tax rates on capital income and government consumption. As discussed in section
3.3, income inequality goes up in steady state when spending on welfare and government employment increase because of
the negative effects these changes have on employment, while it goes down when tax rates raise. Hence, in this experiment,
the effect on inequality of lower spending and higher capital tax rates more than compensate the one due to a decrease in
labor taxation.
33Europe and the US in real per capita income, 31% of the difference in the capital stock, and about
100% of the difference in private sector employment. Considering that we are explaining long - run
values only in terms of differences in ﬁscal policy and that we are disregarding many variables that are
important determinants of long - run growth and standard of livings, results look quite encouraging.
Also, it is interesting to note how ﬁscal policy changes have a greater power in explaining differences
in employment rates. As a matter of fact, there is quite a large literature that explains differences
in structural unemployment between the US and Europe in terms of differences in generosity of the
welfare state, labor taxation andﬂexibility of the labor market.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of ﬁscal policy on economic activity, welfare, income distribution, and
public ﬁnances in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a unionized labor market. The paper
shows that, in response to a debt-ﬁnanced increase in public employment, wages of public sector em-
ployees, unemployment beneﬁts, and labor taxes unions demand higher wages. As a result, employ-
ment in the private sector and the capital stock fall and the economy contracts. The paper also suggests
that policies that redistribute income in favor of one type of workers can damage workers as a group.
In fact, the beneﬁt that the targeted group receives from higher disposable income can be more than
compensated by the cost due to the effect that ﬁscal policy has on the employment rate. Simulations
show that debt-ﬁnanced increases of public employment, public wages and unemployment beneﬁts in-
crease workers’ utility relative to the pre-policy change equilibrium during the transition, but not in the
long-run. Instead, workers’ utility decreases at any time horizon when labor taxes increase. Capitalists
always beneﬁt from increases of taxes on labor and capital income but their welfare decreases when
34public spending goes up. Our basic results concerning the otherﬁscal policy variables hold also when
the wage of the public sector is endogenized. The negative effect of expansions in public employment
are mitigated or even reversed if public spending enters the production function. Finally, we analyze
the sensitivity of the results to the assumption that the government balances its intertemporal budget
constraintbylump-sumtransfers paidonly tocapitalists. Ourconclusions concerning changes inpublic
employment, wage of public employees and unemployment beneﬁts are reinforced if the government
payslump-sumtransfers to workers too. Instead, inresponse to anincrease in tax rateson laborincome,
results are the opposite of those in the benchmark model.
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Table 1: Calibration – benchmark model 
  Preferences and Technology parameters 
                
      0.98  1/3  0.1     
  Macroeconomic and fiscal policy variables 
  1965-1970  1971-1975  1976-1980  1981-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995 
Average 
1965-1995 
Real per capita growth rate  3.94  2.79  2.58  1.47  2.69  0.64  2.41 
Self employed/labor force  21.34  17.89  16.18  15.74  14.84  13.83  16.73 
Effective tax rates on labor income  28.1  32.67  36.69  39.12  41.5  42.6  36.67 
Effective tax rates on capital income  23.79  27.44  33.67  35.95  36.88  34.8  32.09 
Replacement rate  17.42  21.5  24.64  26.94  28.51  32.1  25.17 
Wage public employees/wage private employees  130.79  120.23  110.03  105.9  102.31  104.59  112.42 
Public employment/labor force  12.99  15.15  17.13  18.25  18.82  18.71  16.76 
Gov. non-wage consumption/GDP  4.83  5.26  5.71  5.93  6.08  6.57  5.70 
Debt/GDP  41.25  37.45  39.51  52.5  59.04  70.54  50.36 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook n. 62; Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999); Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Countries in the sample: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
UK. 
Table 2: Macroeconomic variables - benchmark model 
  1965-1970  1971-1975  1976-1980  1981-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995 
Average 
1965-1995 
  Average data 
Capital stock/GDP  185.47  190.9  201.2  211.1  209.7  218.98  202.61 
Investment/GDP  20.29  20.56  18.92  17.05  18.38  16.60  18.66 
Total consumption/GDP  57.91  58.11  58.84  57.89  58.16  58.29  58.19 
Dependent employment rate
1  77.01  79.84  78.99  75.80  76.97  75.44  77.33 
Unemployment rate  2.07  2.64  4.67  8.38  8.13  10.43  5.92 
  Steady state variables generated by the model 
Capital stock/GDP  158.16  162.46  150.68  157.67  142.30  171.12  156.1 
Investment/GDP  22.05  20.78  18.95  18.08  18.06  18.22  19.37 
Total consumption/GDP  73.12  73.96  75.33  75.98  75.86  75.21  74.93 
Dependent employment rate
1  71.51  72.41  71.79  69.47  67.77  57.44  70.43 
Unemployment rate  7.15  9.70  12.03  14.79  17.39  28.73  12.87 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook n. 62; Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999); Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Countries in the sample: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
UK. 
                                                 
1 Dependent employment rate is the sum of employment in the private and public sectors as a share of the labor force.  
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Table 3: Effects of 1% increase in fiscal policy items – benchmark model. 
  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run 
  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   g   Ng   wg   u    N    k 
Macroeconomy                         
Output  0  0  -0.37  -0.55  -0.35  -0.53  -0.28  -0.41  -0.16  -0.24  0  -0.24 
Capital stock  0  0  0  -0.55  0  -0.53  0  -0.41  0  -0.24  0  -0.71 
Investment  0  0  -0.52  -0.55  -0.50  -0.53  -0.39  -0.41  -0.23  -0.24  -0.67  -0.71 
Private sector employment  0  0  -0.55  -0.55  -0.53  -0.53  -0.41  -0.41  -0.24  -0.24  0  0 
Unemployment  0  0  1.00  1.00  2.21  2.21  1.72  1.72  1.00  1.00  0  0 
Rate of return on capital  0  0  -0.37  0  -0.35  0  -0.28  0  -0.16  0  0  0.48 
Private sector workers’ wage rate  0  0  0.19  0  0.18  0  0.14  0  0.08  0  0  -0.24 
Total consumption  -0.076  -0.076  -0.33  -0.55  -0.32  -0.53  -0.25  -0.41  -0.14  -0.24  0.17  -0.11 
                         
Public finances                         
Debt/GDP  0  1.70  0.19  10.3  0.18  11.6  0.14  6.77  0.08  -6.67  0  -3.0 
Primary deficit/GDP  0.06  0.06  0.3  0.3  0.34  0.34  0.19  0.19  -0.25  -0.25  -0.11  -0.11 
Primary spending/GDP  0.06  0.06  0.43  0.43  0.47  0.47  0.22  0.22  0.11  0.11  0  0 
Revenue/GDP  0  0  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.04  0.04  0.35  0.35  0.11  0.11 
Primary spending  0.17  0.17  0.92  0.73  1.06  0.88  0.40  0.26  0.16  0.08  0  -0.24 
Revenue  0  0  -0.06  -0.25  -0.05  -0.23  -0.19  -0.33  0.64  0.56  0.24  0.007 
                         
Welfare costs                         
“hypothetical” household  0.07  0.51  0.56  0.34  0.25  0.08 
capitalist  0.40  2.63  2.94  1.72  -1.50  -0.49 
“hypothetical” worker  0  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.61  0.20 
private sector employee  0  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  0.56  0.20 
public sector employee  0  -0.03  -1.00  -0.02  0.56  0.20 
unemployed  0  -0.03  -0.03  -0.99  -0.01  0.20 
                         
Income distribution                         
Gini coeffcient  0  0.49  -0.14  2.79  0.26  3.53  -0.06  1.88  0.42  -1.50  -0.28  -1.04 
 
Data are given as percentage deviations from to the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium for all variables except debt/GDP, primary deficit/GDP, primary spending/GDP, and revenue/GDP which are 
percentage points deviations. Impact effects correspond to changes at the time of the increase in the fiscal policy item. Long - run effects measure deviations between the post and pre - policy change balanced - 
growth equilibria. For Debt/GDP and Gini coefficient, the long – run effect corresponds to the percentage deviations of the two variables relative to the pre - policy change equilibrium twenty-five years after the 
policy change occurred. The welfare cost of a policy is computed as the percentage change in consumption needed to equate lifetime utility after the policy change to lifetime utility in the pre - policy change case 




Table 4: Effects of 1% increase in fiscal policy items – Model with endogenous public employment and public wages. 
  Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run 
  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   g       u    N    k 
Macroeconomy                     
Output  0  0  -0.08  -0.17  -0.38  -0.87  -0.22  -0.51  0  -0.60 
Capital stock  0  0  0  -0.17  0  -0.87  0  -0.50  0  -1.07 
Investment  0  0  -0.016  -0.18  -0.07  -0.93  -0.05  -0.52  -0.10  -1.12 
Private sector employment  0  0  -0.11  -0.17  -0.57  -0.87  -0.33  -0.51  0  -0.37 
Public sector employment  0  0  0.18  0.24  -0.18  0.48  -0.12  0.30  0  0.54 
Unemployment  0  0  0.11  0.17  1.44  1.74  0.84  1.01  0  0.37 
Rate of return on capital  0  0  -0.08  -0.0004  -0.38  -0.003  -0.22  -0.001  0  0.47 
Private sector workers’ wage rate  0  0  0.038  0.0002  0.19  0.01  0.11  0.0005  0  -0.23 
Public sector workers’ wage rate  0  0  -0.008  -0.07  0.11  -0.20  0.06  -0.12  0  -0.384 
Total consumption  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09  -0.17  -0.46  -0.86  -0.27  -0.50  0.02  -0.47 
                     
Public finances                     
Debt/GDP  0  1.79  0.04  2.27  0.19  9.37  0.11  -7.58  0  -3.41 
Primary deficit/GDP  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.30  0.49  -0.24  -0.13  -0.11  0.12 
Primary spending/GDP  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.16  0.34  0.61  0.15  0.31  0  0.33 
Revenue/GDP  0  0  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.13  0.40  0.44  0.11  0.21 
Primary spending  0.12  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.32  0.39  0.10  0.14  0  0.09 
Revenue  0  0  -0.01  -0.07  -0.29  -0.61  0.60  0.42  0.22  -0.17 
                     
Welfare costs                     
“hypothetical” household  0.31  0.52  2.40  -0.41  0.32 
capitalist  0.18  3.14  15.27  -5.20  1.41 
“hypothetical” worker  0  0.0001  -0.005  0.57  0.10 
private sector employee  0  -0.02  -0.13  0.50  0.08 
public sector employee  0  0.02  -0.006  0.57  0.13 
unemployed  0  -0.02  -1.96  -0.07  0.08 
                     
Income distribution                     
Gini coeffcient  0  0.62  -0.05  0.72  -0.22  2.89  0.29  -2.42  -0.36  -1.58 
 
Data are given as percentage deviations from to the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium for all variables except debt/GDP, primary deficit/GDP, primary spending/GDP, and revenue/GDP which are 
percentage points deviations. Impact effects correspond to changes at the time of the increase in the fiscal policy item. Long - run effects measure deviations between the post and pre - policy change balanced - 
growth equilibria. For Debt/GDP and Gini coefficient, the long – run effect corresponds to the percentage deviations of the two variables relative to the pre - policy change equilibrium twenty-five years after the 
policy change occurred. The welfare cost of a policy is computed as the percentage change in consumption needed to equate lifetime utility after the policy change to lifetime utility in the pre - policy change case 
Primary deficit: a positive change in the primary deficit means that the primary balance deteriorates with respect to its value in the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium.  
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Table 5: Effects of 1% increase in fiscal policy items – Lump-sum transfers equally distributed to different households. 
  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run 
  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   g   Ng   wg   u    N    k 
Macroeconomy                         
Output  -0.02  -0.03  -0.29  -0.44  -0.14  -0.22  -0.07  -0.10  0.10  0.15  0.03  -0.18 
Capital stock  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.44  0.00  -0.22  0.00  -0.10  0.00  0.15  0.00  -0.66 
Investment  -0.02  -0.03  -0.36  -0.44  -0.18  -0.22  -0.08  -0.10  0.12  0.15  -0.54  -0.66 
Private sector employment  -0.03  -0.03  -0.44  -0.44  -0.22  -0.22  -0.10  -0.10  0.15  0.15  0.05  0.05 
Unemployment  0.51  0.51  3.11  3.11  3.96  3.96  1.81  1.81  -2.66  -2.66  -0.96  -0.96 
Rate of return on capital  -0.02  0.00  -0.29  0.00  -0.14  0.00  -0.07  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.03  0.47 
Private sector workers’ wage rate  0.01  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.02  -0.24 
Total consumption  -0.09  -0.10  -0.27  -0.44  -0.14  -0.22  -0.06  -0.10  0.09  0.15  0.18  -0.06 
                         
Public finances                         
Primary deficit/GDP  0.07  0.07  0.22  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.04  0.04  -0.36  -0.36  -0.12  -0.12 
Primary spending/GDP  0.07  0.07  0.32  0.32  0.28  0.28  0.05  0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02 
Revenue/GDP  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.01  0.01  0.31  0.31  0.10  0.10 
Primary spending  0.24  0.23  0.91  0.77  0.91  0.84  0.11  0.08  -0.11  -0.06  -0.04  -0.26 
Revenue  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.19  0.07  -0.01  -0.05  -0.08  0.82  0.87  0.28  0.06 
                         
Welfare costs                         
“hypothetical” household  0.11  0.48  0.29  0.10  -0.26  0.01 
capitalist  0.21  0.97  0.72  0.19  -1.11  0.00 
“hypothetical” worker  0.10  0.39  0.21  0.08  -0.09  0.01 
private sector employee  0.08  0.31  0.26  0.06  0.01  0.04 
public sector employee  0.07  0.28  -0.57  0.05  0.06  0.05 
Unemployed  0.16  0.63  0.51  -0.49  -0.87  -0.11 
                         
Income distribution                         
Gini coeffcient  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.85  0.85  0.06  0.06  0.12  0.12  -0.84  -0.84 
 
Data are given as percentage deviations from to the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium for all variables except primary deficit/GDP, primary spending/GDP, and revenue/GDP which are percentage 
points deviations. Impact effects correspond to changes at the time of the increase in the fiscal policy item. Long - run effects measure deviations between the post and pre - policy change balanced - growth 
equilibria. For Gini coefficient, the long – run effect corresponds to its percentage deviations relative to the pre - policy change equilibrium twenty-five years after the policy change occurred. The welfare cost of a 
policy is computed as the percentage change in consumption needed to equate lifetime utility after the policy change to lifetime utility in the pre - policy change case Primary deficit: a positive change in the primary 






Table 6: Effects of 1% increase in fiscal policy items – US average data. 
  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run  Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run Impact  Long-run 
  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   g   Ng   wg   u    N    k 
Macroeconomy                         
Output  0  0  -0.19  -0.28  -0.11  -0.17  -0.04  -0.06  -0.01  -0.02  0  -0.37 
Capital stock  0  0  0  -0.28  0  -0.17  0  -0.06  0  -0.02  0  -1.1 
Investment  0  0  -0.28  -0.28  -0.17  -0.17  -0.06  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02  -1.1  -1.1 
Private sector employment  0  0  -0.28  -0.28  -0.17  -0.17  -0.06  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02  0  0 
Unemployment  0  0  1  1  2.38  2.38  0.83  0.83  0.28  0.28  0  0 
Rate of return on capital  0  0  -0.19  0  -0.11  0  -0.04  0  -0.01  0  0  0.74 
Private sector workers’ wage rate  0  0  0.09  0  0.06  0  0.02  0  0.007  0  0  -0.37 
Total consumption  -0.09  -0.09  -0.17  -0.28  -0.10  -0.17  -0.03  -0.06  -0.01  -0.02  0.23  0.21 
                         
Public finances                         
Debt/GDP  0  1.99  0.09  5.50  0.05  5.06  0.02  0.82  0.006  -6.07  0  -3.73 
Primary deficit/GDP  0.07  0.07  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.02  0.02  -0.20  -0.20  -0.14  -0.14 
Primary spending/GDP  0.07  0.07  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.023  0.023  0.005  0.005  0  0 
Revenue/GDP  0  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.002  0.002  0.21  0.21  0.14  0.14 
Primary spending  0.3  0.3  0.71  0.62  0.76  0.70  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.003  0  -0.37 
Revenue  0  0  -0.04  -0.14  0.01  -0.04  -0.03  -0.05  0.59  0.58  0.40  0.03 
                         
Welfare costs                         
“hypothetical” household  0.04  0.16  0.13  0.03  0.20  0.23 
capitalist  0.42  1.23  1.11  0.18  -1.26  -0.51 
“hypothetical” worker  0  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.34  0.31 
private sector employee  0  -0.01  -0.008  -0.003  0.34  0.31 
public sector employee  0  -0.01  -0.98  -0.003  0.34  0.31 
unemployed  0  -0.01  -0.008  -0.97  -0.001  0.31 
                         
Income distribution                         
Gini coeffcient  0  0.52  -0.04  1.41  0.29  1.61  0.02  0.24  0.25  -1.36  -1.09  -1.18 
(1) Data are given as percentage deviations from to the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium for all variables except debt/GDP, primary deficit/GDP, primary spending/GDP, and revenue/GDP which are 
percentage point deviations. Impact effects correspond to changes at the time of the increase in the fiscal policy item. Long - run effects measure deviations between the post and pre - policy change balanced - growth 
equilibria. For Debt/GDP and Gini coefficient, the long – run effect corresponds to the percentage deviations of the two variables relative to the pre - policy change equilibrium twenty-five years after the policy 
change occurred. The welfare cost of a policy is computed as the percentage change in consumption needed to equate lifetime utility after the policy change to lifetime utility in the pre - policy change case Primary 
deficit: a positive change in the primary deficit means that the primary balance deteriorates with respect to its value in the pre - policy change balanced - growth equilibrium. 
(2) Parameters used to calibrate the model:  =0.98,  =1/3,  =0.10. The other data used to calibrate the model are US average data over the period 1965 – 1995. Tax rates on labor and capital income are from Daveri 
and Tabellini (2000) and Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999). They are equal to 25.63% and 42.33%, respectively. The remaining data are from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 62. Real per capita growth rate = 1.97%; 
self employed/labor force = 9.07%; replacement rate = 15.81%; wage public employees/wage private employee = 108.77%; public employment/labor force = 14.75%; government non wage consumption/GDP = 
6.65%; debt/GDP = 46.73%.  
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Table 7: Fiscal policy and macroeconomic performance in Europe and in the US 












%   of variables 
from EU average 




%   of variables 
predicted by model.
  
Initial steady state 
calibrated with EU 
average data 
Final steady state 




Fraction of the 
change in the data 




           
Fiscal policy           
           
Effective tax rates on labor income  36.67  25.63  -30.16     
Effective tax rates on capital income  32.09  42.33  31.91     
Employment in public sector/population  7.58  6.71  -11.47     
Public employment/labor force  16.76  14.75  -11.99     
Wage public employees/wage private employees  112.42  108.77  -3.25     
Replacement rate  25.17  15.81  -37.19     
Gov. non-wage consumption/GDP  5.70  6.65  16.66     
           
Macroeconomy           
           
Real per capita GDP (PPP values)  13413.67  19862.72  48.07  9.09  18.91 
Real per capita capital stock (PPP values)  27674.86  21220.84  -23.32  -7.34  31.47 
Employment in private sector/population  26.76  32.57  21.70  18.37  84.65 
Employment in private sector/labor force  60.57  71.45  17.96  18.37  102.28 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook n. 62; Daveri and Maffezzoli (1999); Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
 Figure 1: Effects of a 1% increase in public spending and tax revenue variables - benchmark model
Figure 2: Effects of a 1% increase in public employment

























































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15Figure 3: Benchmark model and model with endogenous public employment and public wages
              Benchmark model - 1% shock to Ng             Benchmark model - 1% shock to wg
                Model with endogenous public employment and public wages - 1% shock to   
Figure 4: Fiscal policy in Europe versus the United States
(i)
(i) Experiment: Fiscal policy variables assume the values of the average data of the European countries in the sample in the initial steady state equilibrium.
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